

Well, thank you General Sullivan, and thank you all for being here this morning. This is my first time to be at this event, although I have followed it from afar. And there are many thanks to give out to folks here who have been a great influence to me already in my just two years serving in the United States Army.

And General Sullivan kindly recognized many of them. Let me thank again though, Mr. [INAUDIBLE]-- thank you for sponsoring this breakfast. General Craddock, it was an honor to sit next to you and to learn more about your distinguished career as well.

I know we have around here many folks I work with-- General Spoeher, of course who spoke at this very podium just a few weeks ago works closely with me in my job as the chief management officer of the Army. And I know he spoke about business transformation, something I we'll briefly touch on as well. And there are many other great distinguished civilian workers who do such heroic things for the army here today. I know we have a number of active duty folks who I see around the Pentagon, a number of retirees and many folks who, out in the business sector, are providing able support to our army today as well. So thank you all for letting me be a small part of your morning.

I have now been on the job 60 days, and I hope, because my tenure has been so brief, you will indulge me a bit. I had prepared remarks, but last night, as I left a dinner party, I thought I would forego those remarks and instead speak a bit extemporaneously and talk about some of the things that I think about, as the undersecretary of the army.

And I won't offer today many answers to you about, kind of what I think the future of the army is going to be or offer you even great optimism that all of these problems can be solved. Instead I thought I might just enumerate a few of the questions that animate me as now a senior leader of the army and in so doing perhaps give you some insight into kind of the way I think and perhaps the way that Secretary McHugh does as well.

And I would be remiss in not mentioning secretary McHugh, who does such a terrific job leading the army. I had the chance to serve with him in Congress. He was of the opposite party to me, much older than I was in a very hierarchical institution. So we didn't know each other well, but it has been a great

honor for me to serve with him in the United States Army, where his decision-making on a day-to-day basis faces some of the most controversial questions that one can imagine is always impeccable.

And the same thing can be said about our chief of staff, General Odierno, who is confronted with an extraordinary challenging time. As we come out of OIF and OEF, as the budget draws down, he, too, does an extraordinary job leading our army. And so we are so, so very lucky to have people like that.

So as I mentioned, I want, today, to talk not so much to you, as to talk with you and to eschew the kind of standard oratorical affair in the hopes of, again, posing some questions to you that I think are going to be the most important ones facing the army over the next two, five, perhaps even 10, years. It's worth setting the scene, though, about the context, if you will, from which these questions arise.

Now this context is one well-known to the people in this room, but it is a context worth repeating again, because the facts and the figures are increasingly harrowing. The army budget this year is about \$120 billion. We will get \$20 to \$25 billion more in the so-called overseas contingency operations funds. So a total budget of a little less than \$150 billion-- I'm sure Joe Martz can give me the exact and precise figure, if he were up here advising me.

That, of course, is a far cry from what it was just a few years ago when the overall army budget peaked in 2008, a year when the OCO budget was actually larger than the base, the base budget reaching its acme in 2010 at a little more than \$140 billion. At our height we had 570,000 people in the army. Today, we still have, as we speak, more than 500,000 people in the army-- about 503,000 to be exact, on our way down to numbers far less than that-- 490,000 450,000. And if sequestration continues to work its sinister effect on the army, we'll be down to 420,000 and perhaps great pressure to go to numbers still far below that.

We have an active component that has tremendous combat experience. We have about 40 brigade combat teams, kind of the hallmark fighting units for the army-- 28 in the National Guard. We have a National Guard that is more than 350,000 people today. A Army Reserve COMPO-3 that has a little less than 200,000 people-- about 5,000 people less than it is authorized to do. And as the army goes down to, say, 420,000, that the reserve component will draw down commensurately, with the Guard going down to perhaps as low as 315,000 and the Army Reserve going down to 185,000.

So there are big changes before us, and how we manage these changes, both in the draw-down of

officers-- just this week, we announced the separation of more than 1,000 captains-- these kind of involuntary separations are painful to everyone. And as the chief reminded the US Senate just this week at the Senate caucus breakfast, there are real costs, human costs, to the draw-down that the budget situation is imposing upon us.

We've, of course, been here before, and there are many in this room, who have decades of experience in the US Army, said you have seen crises like this before. Just here, at the head table where I was sitting, we had people who have lived and worked these issues before. So I said I wanted to offer a few questions without offering you definitive answers. I do so in the spirit of a very wise man who once said that, in the army, and perhaps in all things, the intellectual must lead the physical. And General Sullivan, when you uttered those words many years ago, they were very true, and they remain true today. So let me talk about some of these questions, things that I think about and that I think the army should think about as well.

The first of these questions is one that I would pose to the Department of Defense. And this is the only question I would offer today that goes to the larger entity than simply the US Army. I'll offer you 10 more that I offer just to the US Army, and then I'll offer a rhetorical want to conclude. This first question is whether this process that so drives institutional the institutional army, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, is still the right system for defense planning in this country.

Now you know I'm amazed, as a politician and as someone who once taught business school, which is what I was doing before I immediately came to the army a couple of years ago, that Robert McNamara will go down perhaps as the greatest bureaucrat since Alexander Hamilton in his influence. Today we still in the Department of Defense live underneath his shadow. And when he put in the PPBE process more than 50 years ago now, he made decisions about force structure that lasted throughout the Cold War.

This process, now entrenched, now capitalized throughout the entire building, it has worked well in some ways-- but I think it is a question worth considering-- whether it is still the optimal planning system for an age of uncertainty, where we have to go forward not clear who the exact threats might be-- the need to be more agile, the need to be more flexible in our planning. So the PPBE system-- it may not be optimized to do that. It may not be optimized in a world now where the combatant commanders, something that he didn't have to think as much about, are the driving force within the Department of

Defense.

So we now seemingly have a odd system where combatant commanders, who were the consumers of what we provide as a military service, have no real say in the supply of things offered to them. They have indirect say, that is true. So I'm being a bit hyperbolic, but nonetheless we are providing services to customers who don't have a direct input on what the various departments are providing to them. That would seem to be a misalignment of incentives in a way that calls into question the continued vitality of a planning system that has worked well but is now, again, more than half a century old.

Even back in the 1960s, when Charles Hitch was the comptroller of the Department of Defense, he recognized some of these weaknesses-- particularly the one I just mentioned, and offer solutions to it but was unable to get to any traction. But these are questions right, that are as vital today as they were back then, if not more so.

So turning to the United States Army-- even when I was in Congress, I wrestled with the question, and I wrestled with it often, actually, as the general counsel, and as the undersecretary of the army, too. When someone on the street, someone perhaps even well tutored in defense issues, asks me, how do you think about the optimal size for the United States Army? What should it be?

How do you even go about approaching a question like that? Well, when I was in Congress I could never really do. What's the difference in 450 versus 440,000 troops? Versus 500,000 troops? Or, perhaps, as Admiral Roughead recently wrote, 280,000 troops-- his desired in state for the active component in the army?

What's the difference? I mean, how does one go about even thinking about this kind of question? And why do so many people seem to have a very different view about what the ideal state size of the US Army is versus what probably most of us in this room think and certainly the institutional army might think it to be.

I thought about that-- about where the communication breaks down. And I think it comes down to this-- it's an age-old question too much like this PPBE matter-- but it's the first question I would offer you today. And that is, are we going to size the US Army based on needed capabilities or on assessed threats? Now this is, again, an older question. Throughout the Cold War, we basically had a threat-based construct. We had a clearly identifiable threat with known capabilities, we could plan to allow us

to bring it dominated across the document or PDF of what we were trying to do.

We still talked about capabilities when you had Bob McNamara, who I've already cited, discussing the need for the ability to fight 2 and 1/2 wars. And after the Cold War ended, of course, and that obvious threat receded, we moved to more emphasis on those capabilities with two wars, or 1 and 1/2 wars-- or now we're at one and a quarter wars or a war and an air war, or however the construct is today but right this notion of needing to have capabilities even if you really weren't quite sure what the threats were.

Now the threats never truly disappeared, because it's important to have scenarios by which one tests your capabilities, kind of imaginary situations out there you might have to fight in. But capabilities dominated kind of the post-Cold War era. But it seems to me that in this age of budget austerity, we are increasingly back to threat-based planning, where the army cannot tie its force structure to an identifiable threat in Asia, or the Middle East or, perhaps we now see in Europe as well, it's difficult to justify its size.

Now these are philosophical questions right, about how one should think about what the size the US Army. And for most of us in the army, we believe that, even if there wasn't an obvious threat from which would need a million man and woman army across the AC and the RC, a superpower like ours faced with strategic surprise, things we never anticipate quite and never can quite anticipate, should have the ability to do certain things. Right? Again, not tethered to a particular scenario, although scenarios can test us, but that we should have certain abilities, right, to do things-- a capability-based approach.

This is seemingly a somewhat disfavored view now, although it never articulated in perhaps as clear a way as I have offered here. But this is a major question to the army that we must grapple with, is are going to be a threat-based structure or a capabilities-based structure?

I will go over these other questions perhaps more briefly, but the second one goes to the heart of the work I do, which is, what is the ideal of size of the generating force-- a force that has varied from 80 to 110,000 people over the last 15 years-- that generating force, of course, being the people charged with manning and training and equipping our operators. You know, what is the right size of that force? We don't model it with the same fidelity we do with the operating force, we take guesses at it more-- we think we have it right. But what is the right size for that?

And a third question, related to it, is how does that generating force size vary with the size of the operating force? We know it's not perfectly linear, if we draw down the operating force by 10 percent, the generating force doesn't necessarily fall by 10 percent. There is some floor below which even if we only had, God forbid, 100,000 operators, you would still need an operating force of 50 or 100,000, perhaps, too, right? Just to man, train and equip the army, and prepare for the day when, again that strategic surprise arises and we have to increase it rapidly.

Increasing it rapidly leads to that fourth question, a fourth question that we must grapple with and that we must convince our interlocutors at the Office of the Secretary of Defense to think about, too, which is, how fast can the army grow? Now we're moving to a world, where, as the chief often says, the army will be at its lowest size since before World War II. Where we had 280,000 people, 14,500 officers at that time.

Now in just the space of six years we grew to 90 divisions and more than eight million people in the US Army, an extraordinary achievement. But we did it under very different circumstances-- an existential threat to the nation, conscription, which had minimal political opposition. One can grow the army rapidly when a true crisis arises. But, short of that, it is very, very difficult to do so.

Between 2000 and 2011, including those years when we had all kinds of incentives in place trying to grow the army-- admittedly in a war environment that was not always the easiest to recruit in, the most the enlisted force ever grew in a single year was nine percent. If we were to try to grow our army from 420,000, as we are moving to, if not lower, to, say, back to 550 or 570,000, we would have to grow our force by 35 to 40 percent in accessions each year. Accessions, I mentioned, grew by nine percent at their height-- not just the overall force.

Accessions never increase year over year by more than nine percent, but we would have to grow accessions by probably 35 or 40 percent per year. Now that is probably not possible, no matter what kind of financial incentives one puts in place, but to even try to do that, right, is an extraordinarily costly thing-- costly not only in terms of the special pay and benefits that we might have to offer, but costly, too, in the fact that, as we saw during the Grow the Army era, standards will have to be relaxed.

People like me can get into the US Navy, for example, long past the age that one should normally be joining the United States Navy. But more than that, right, during that period, I saw this offer when I was general counsel, people were coming into the army who were from a lower quintile and the AFQT

distribution. Perhaps they were getting waivers, because they had been involved in petty criminal behavior as a young man or woman. Their fitness wasn't what it was, perhaps they had medical conditions, for which they had to have waivers.

We will deal with these things on the back end. And sometimes people come into the services who aren't equipped for the rigors of combat. And to them the consequences of seeing things in the front lines are even more devastating than they would be to people perhaps who come in with greater physical and mental fitness. And for those people we rightfully take care of them, but we will take care of them for decades and decades to come.

Some of you may have seen the recent article in the Wall Street Journal that we are still paying benefits to a single woman from the Civil War. Now given the fact that people are living longer and longer, it is not unimaginable-- in fact, it is entirely predictable that we will be paying benefits to survivors of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts until the middle of the next century. So that's an amazing thing, and the consequence will be billions and billions and billions of dollars to go.

The fifth question I will offer to you quickly is how do plan for the regeneration of the US Army? If we're going to go down to 420,000 or, God forbid, lower than that, how do you build it back up? Right, how do you quickly move back not only to recruit the right people, to make sure you have the units, the field-grade officers, the senior NCOs who can take leadership roles in there-- not an easy question, either.

The Rand Corporation recently did an analysis on this very question, and they tentatively estimated that what the army should do is keep about 15,000 officers or senior NCOs, in the generating force, and leave them there, parked, if you will. In case a crisis breaks out, they can be the nucleus for regrowing the army.

Now this seems like a perfectly plausible, indeed very good idea, but it isn't easy to do. Because when you keep those folks in the army, and you are limited in the number of troops you can have, cuts have to be made elsewhere. And of course senior NCOs and field-grade officers are more expensive than other perhaps younger officers or young soldiers, and therefore your grade plate gets out of whack, and when your budget is under pressure, this becomes more expensive, too. So our even ability to do that challenges the way we do business.

A sixth question I would offer to you, and this is an important one that the current chief of staff is

grappling with, along with Dave Perkins down at Training and Doctrine Command, is whether the army's concepts of operations are adequate to a world where precision-guided munitions are proliferating to a world where the price of computing power, sensors, weaponry, is going down relative to the cost of the means to protect against them, whether it's better armor, stealth, Hypersonic speed.

Whether our operating concepts are adapted to a war where our adversaries scrupulously avoid ever crossing a red line that they know would invoke American military response but instead rely upon [INAUDIBLE] Information Operations or proxies to achieve their goals. Are we ready for that kind of world?

A seventh question is what's the proper role of the reserve component-- not only the National Guard, of course, which has been much in the news, but also United States Army Reserve. Should the Guard be operational or strategic? Should all of the combat effects that are in the reserve components be in the National Guard and not in the US Army Reserve as well? An Army Reserve, which is filled with technical enablers of the first order but lacks, really, combat power. Or should those roles be shared in some way between the two components?

An eighth question deals with modernization. Should we focus on resetting the vast property book of the Army, or should we be thinking about next generation investments? And how do you balance these kind of things? Ray Mason, who I'm sure has been here on many occasions, does a terrific job on these issues. And the army property book, which I'm sure doesn't capture everything we own, is now at more than \$250 billion. We have a lot of gear out there. It is expensive to sustain it, it's expensive to recapitalize it as it comes out of theatre. Some of it may not even be needed for the kind of wars we think we have to fight in the future. So how do we balance these kind of priorities?

A ninth question for you is whether ARFORGEN-- ARFORGEN, that readiness model adopted in the wake of OIF and OEF, and it's proved so successful to us but comes at a high price-- whether that's the right model of readiness for the future. I'm sure General Huggins, who sits over here, has dedicated people who think nothing but about this very question of whether ARFORGEN is right, or is a return to tiered readiness, or perhaps some hybrid model is the best for the future. But this is a very important and will be a major change in the US Army and a challenge we confront.

And a tenth question, and perhaps somewhat controversial, but one that's of great interest to me, is whether our emphasis on decisive action training is adequate to prepare for the range of military

operations the United States is going to face over the next 10, 20 or 30 years. These are the kind of things that TRADOC is working about and that when the chief, who has chartered the first 2025 and beyond effort, is looking at, too. What is the army to train to and how do we deal with it?

So these are the 10 questions that I often think about one posed OSD in addition. And let me end with a rhetorical question, which is something that is incumbent upon me but those in this room care about the army, too, to also think about- is, can we explain ourselves to the American public, to the US Congress and to the Office of Secretary of Defense in a way that they can understand the things that most of you have lived and understand so well.

I'll give you just one example from an anecdote that occurred at the dinner party I was attending last night, which involved a discussion about a major figure who formerly worked in the OSD policy, who had a big hand in all these national strategic documents that have rolled out. Most of which, well they don't treat the army in the way that most of us in this room think the army should have been treated.

So there's discussion about how much combat power, say, half-million person active component army would really bring. Half million people seems like a lot of folks, after all right, to a lay person at least? Even lay people who, again, spend lots of time in the national security space. So you said, you know, a half million people would seem to be adequate for nearly every kind of imaginable problem that this country might face.

But, of course, one has to get into those numbers and explain them in a way that this person, so involved in national strategic issues and national security policy making, had no idea. He had no idea that, yes, we might have 500,000 people, but 80,000 of them are trainees, transients, holdees and students, and therefore they can't fight. That we have a generating force of 80 to 100,000 people who are necessary to man, train and equip those people who might fight. That we have 20,000 or 30,000 people who are doing national missions, like theater missile defense or security cooperation who, sure they could be pulled out, perhaps and sent elsewhere, but the national command authority thinks they're very important.

So yes, you're left with maybe out that 500,000 person force, about 300,000 or 325,000 who could be deployed somewhere. But, of course, Congress itself-- this isn't simply an army preference-- doesn't want to send you over there to stay to you win it, right? We want to rotate you out, and we have good reason for rotating you out. So, yes, even if you want to go on, say, a one to one, BOG:Dwell ratio--

boots on ground at the time in theatre, right you're talking about 150,000 people who can go at any one moment. And Congress would like to have a longer BOG:Dwell ratio than that, and pretty soon you're much, much smaller at the number of people can actually go and fight at any given moment.

All right, this was surprisingly news to this major figure right, that are 500,000 force when you're providing not only combat power but the entire sub strata of American military power, which is what the US Army does, right? We don't just fight. We bring the dogs and the mortuary affairs and that cooks and the cleaners and everyone else in between, to allow the other service to do their job.

All right, when you put all of these kind of things together, right, that the Army has to have a certain size just to do this job. And that size is larger than even very smart people might think it should be. Now I don't begrudge this person for not knowing that, because it's our job to explain it to him. And when he doesn't understand it, it means that people like me have failed in our job.

So I conclude with that rhetorical question, to say we must do a better job of explaining ourselves to the people who love this country, love the military, who love the US Army, too, but sometimes don't understand that this is the world's most complicated organization. And the way we run it, is often opaque even to its most senior leaders. And we have to be better at explaining to the people-- the people who own the army-- the American public and their representatives right, what we do and our vision for the future. And we must be better. We've done it well, but we haven't done it well enough.

So thank you for letting me come say a few words to you today. I'm sure you have a few questions, as well, for me, and I am grateful to General Sullivan for extending the opportunity. Army strong.

[APPLAUSE]

Jim Grant from Missile Line Defense-- perhaps an eleventh question that you could add to your repertoire, while I think it's, I think, inherent in recapitalization and modernization et cetera, is the question of how does a healthy industrial base tie in to all of the things you're talking about?

I could have easily added that as a priority of ours, right? A healthy industrial base is critical, and it's hard to maintain that when you have these cuts in the army procurement accounts, for example. But that's a vital national asset, of which I hope as the undersecretary to be able to help work with. And I think it's under-appreciated as, again, one of those issues that, even people who care a lot about

national security don't understand how vital that industrial base is-- and the threat that sequestration, the budget cuts are posing to that. So it plays a critical role, and I think across the Department of Defense, people give lip service to that but oftentimes don't devote the resources or have a coherent strategy to do that. So hopefully I can help with that.

Roger Thompson with AUSA-- we talk, in the association, about some of the things that you've talked about in some detail. One of the things that has become more public more recently is testimony on Capitol Hill, in which senior leaders of both the entire United States military, as well as the army, have talked about risk and the concept of risk. Obviously there are lots of ways to define it and discuss it, but operational risk, strategic risk, risk of being viable in these capabilities emissions. Can you comment about how the concept of risk and implications fit into what you've just talked about, please?

Yes, absolutely. Risk, I think, is the word I hear most commonly from the army these days. Basically everything we do, we can't do what we really aspire to do, and we define that gap as being risk. So you know I often ask this question. In fact, I have Colonel Paul Paolozzi, who runs my strategic initiatives group, is in the back here. And I actually have a task for them. I said I like you to write for me a history of how we use the term risk across the department of defense, because we use it so much, I said it's a great interest to me what that phrase really means and now it has made its way into our doctrine and concepts and things like that.

But for me, I think, I use risk in this common way-- that when there is a gap between our ends, ways and means, right, we have a risk of some kind. Now how you quantify risk, between high and moderate, right, is professional military judgment in many ways right? So when the chief says this is moderate risk, he is using is more than 30 years of experience to say that this is what it is.

I'll tell you the way I approach it, which is a little bit differently perhaps, and I think it is a way of explaining things to policymakers. All right, I never tell people and discuss these kind of questions, right, that failure well ensue from any decision they reach for us right? If we don't have enough training days for our people, we will still prevail in the conflict, because we have the world's best army, right? We will win, at a certain cost that one doesn't really know for sure, right?

But people who spend their lives thinking about these issues think will be more costly financially and in blood of our young men and women, and perhaps strategic objectives will be harder to obtain over time, but right, we will prevail in the end. And to lay out for them, the choices they have. For example, if

they want to have a 400,000 person US Army, right, the army will still be a formidable force.

There will be no army that can compete with us. But if you want us to fight around the world, it will be hard to do so, right? The BOG:Dwell ratios will be impossible to maintain. We'll have to use the reserve component in very strenuous ways. We know on the back end if you want to do all these levers, right, that we have family breakdowns and divorces and kind of social problems arise when you keep people apart for years at a time from their loved ones, right? These are all things that are levers that people can pull, right? And if all hell broke loose tomorrow, we would pull those levers, right, in some way?

So that's what I try to explain myself in using the term risk, right? Policy makers are the people who should be taking risks. We need to tell them, frankly, kind of like here's what you can do. Here's how you would mitigate those kinds of things. And, you know, there are many competing priorities in this country, right? Things besides the US Army. There are tax cuts, there's social services, there is the US Navy and the Air Force and the Pacific Pivot, in which they're playing a key role.

We elect people and put great responsibility on them to balance these kinds of risks. And so what I try to do in talking to them is to say, like, here's what the real risk is. And it's grave in our mind, but maybe you have countervailing concerns that are still more pressing to you, right, that you should be aware of. And therefore you can make the right decision about it.

So, you know we use risk a lot, and it's a term we love to use, because there are lots of things that are at risk in the US Army today. I think in part of our communication strategy, we need to try to be better about explaining exactly what that risk is to people, how you try to quantify it in some way, or at least offer a qualitative discussion of it, and then kind of ways that it could be mitigated-- or what the consequences are. Because I think when people say risk, people think, like, well failure is going to ensue. Well it's unlikely that failure is going to ensue, right? It's just costly, right? And real cost to people. And therefore gives us more credibility in discussing kind of what the courses of action for them might be.

Yes, sir?

Hi, my name's Franklin Childress from the Army Reserve. You alluded to the fact that there were downsizing a lot of our captains and majors and NCOs. We view those people as a valuable resource in the nation. How do we communicate to those people how valuable their service has been and

encourage them to continue to serve in the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

Well, we hope that they will do that. As I mentioned, we are separating about more than 1,000 captains-- that was just announced this week. The authorizations in the US Army are 205,000-- we have about 198,000 people in the Army Reserve today. And that was an intention, right, of the Army Reserve from a few years ago to try to have some slack in there, where some of these fine officers could join them.

And the truth is many of the folks who are separating are very fine officers-- very fine enlisted soldiers as well-- people who have combat experience, some of them decorated for their combat experience. And so getting them into the Guard the USAR is a priority of ours. And we are trying to communicate that with them. Right, we need to work at still some things, right, where people can transfer MOS's, as an example, right, if there are higher demands in the US Army Reserve than perhaps for a particular MOS and trying to do those kind of transitions.

But it's an important thing for us, right, because the people we're separating are great Americans and finding a way for them to continue to serve, as most of them want to do, in the Guard and the Reserve, is going to be a very important part of that.

So something that we can communicate from the highest levels, like from me, and also make sure we have programs in place, right, that make that transition a seamless one for them-- again, changing their occupations if needed to do that as well.

Good morning, sir. I'm David Fastabend, currently of Exelis, but formerly [INAUDIBLE] on the army staff. I wish I had you helping me write the ASPG a few years ago, because if the army could take your 10 questions and answer them, it would be probably the best strategic planning guidance we ever published. One of your questions was particularly interesting to me, in the one about the ARFORGEN model, because depending on the only answer to that question, your math, which was spot-on, changes dramatically.

If you don't have a rotating force, the argument for force structure changes completely. So can you give us any ideas of how that debate is going and how that question might be answered? General Huggins could probably give you a more definitive answer, because it's back in your old shop and places like that, right, where these things are really being worked on. I would say it hasn't percolated up to my level, other than this question of, right, is this the right model for us?

People understand that we need to look at alternatives to it, but there's been no discussion among the secretary or me, and I don't among the secretary and the chief, about what are really viable alternatives to us, right? Going back to a tiered readiness system, right, is not something that people openly aspire to. That is seen as kind of-- tiered readiness is not a term with positive connotations throughout the US Army today-- for lots of reasons.

And so the question is what are the alternatives to that, right, what are the real costs to that? So I know that there are lots of folks who work with General Huggins who are thinking deeply and working on alternatives for us, but I think we're still a ways away from moving to a system other than ARFORGEN. It's-- well, you know the army well, right. There's an inertia that-- it takes a lot of thinking. I mean, and it's an important issue, right? These readiness models are-- and how we do it, is something you don't take likely. So it's working its way through the system, but I think we're still a ways away from announcing any kind of changes on that.

Thank you very much, sir. Let's have a round of applause.

Thank you.